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Westfield 5 years on
Professor Michael Weir*
The 2007 High Court decision in Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual
Trustee Company Ltd dealt with significant issues relevant to the
interpretation of easements using extrinsic evidence and the integrity of the
Torrens title register. The decision was not entirely clear in some aspects
with some issues remaining unanswered including whether there are
implications for the interpretation of other registerable interests such as
restrictive convenants. Five years after this decision this article considers
how subsequent cases have applied the High Court’s judgement allowing
conclusions to be reached about the broader impact of this authority.
The High Court decision in Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee
Company Ltd1 provided guidance in relation to the interpretation of registered
easements. In the 2009 article ‘The Westfield case: A change for the better?’2
it was stated that:
Westfield provides interesting guidance in relation to the interpretation of registered
easements and provides a reaffirmation of fundamental Torrens title principles. What
the case also does is create further uncertainty in relation to what if any extrinsic
evidence may be available to assist in construction of easements.
The 2009 article also speculated that theWestfield decision could impact on
the interpretation of other registered interests such as leases.3 This paper
reviews the approaches taken by subsequent court decisions in applying the
Westfield decision. The concerns expressed in the 2009 article, in relation to
the potential of the Westfield decision to create uncertainty, have been borne
out in the manner in which courts have struggled to apply the principles of the
Westfield case. This has resulted in very different approaches to the
construction of easements and its impact on the interpretation of other
registered interests. Although Westfield has been considered and applied in a
number of significant cases, there is still some doubt as to how this decision
should be applied in relation to a number of key issues which this article will
seek to identify, analyse and clarify.
Overview of the Westfield decision
It is worthwhile to provide a brief overview of the decision as a background
to the discussion in this article. The decision required the High Court to
construe a registered easement which permitted vehicular access from Pitt
Street Mall in the Central Business District of Sydney, over a property called
* Faculty of Law, Bond University, Gold Coast, Queensland.
1 (2007) 233 CLR 528; 239 ALR 75; [2007] HCA 45; BC200708402 (Westfield).
2 M Weir, ‘The Westfield case: A change for the better?’ (2009) 21(2) Bond LR 182 (the 2009
article).
3 Different issues may arise in regard to old system land. Broadcast Australia Pty Ltd v Kim
Noonan [2011] NSWSC 1524 (12 December 2011); Kitching v Phillips (2011) 278 ALR
551; [2011] WASCA 19; BC201100167 (28 January 2011) at [47].
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Glasshouse (servient tenement), to another property Skygarden (dominant
tenement). Four buildings; Glasshouse, Skygarden, Imperial Arcade and
Centrepoint, had a frontage to the pedestrian — only Pitt Street Mall that runs
at right angles to King Street. Only Glasshouse fronted King Street from
which vehicular access was available. When Glasshouse was developed in
1988, based on local authority planning incentives to encourage the
establishment of the Pitt Street Mall (established in 1987), Glasshouse
provided for a carriageway easement giving access to Skygarden. In 1988 all
four lots were under separate ownership. Subsequently Westfield acquired
Skygarden, Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint, and was desirous of
redeveloping these sites and using the right of way giving access to
Skygarden, to also provide access for the commercial purposes intended to
occur on Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint; for driveways, parking spaces and
loading docks. The litigation involved a discussion of whether this was
possible under the terms of the registered easement.4
The ratio decidendi of the decision of the High Court, was based upon a
standard construction of the easement, which relied upon the fact that the
easement document permitted a party ‘to go, pass and repass at all times and
for all purposes . . . to and from the said dominant tenement [lots benefited] or
any such part thereof’. However, for activities permitted with respect to the
servient tenement (Glasshouse), the rights include the ability to use the
easement ‘across the lots burdened’:
This expression is apt to describe entry from King Street, and passage across the
Glasshouse site of the servient tenement to reach Skygarden as the destination. What
is significant for the present dispute is that the Easement does not also speak of
activities ‘across’ rather than ‘to and from’ the dominant tenement (Skygarden).5
On that basis the High Court concluded that the easement granted in favour
of Skygarden did not entitle access to the neighbouring Imperial Arcade and
Centrepoint. This view was consistent with a substantial jurisprudence
referred to by the High Court, which suggests an easement giving access to a
parcel of land, does not normally extend to a parcel of land beyond the
dominant tenement.6
The aspect of the decision that has caused most concern were the comments
made in relation to the use of extrinsic material to construe the easement.7 The
court was concerned with arguments addressed to them and previously to the
trial judge, in the form of affidavits about the subjective intention of the owner
of Skygarden and attempts to determine the intention or contemplation of the
parties at the time of the grant.8 It was argued these intentions should be
applied to assist in the construction of the easement. Perpetual Trustee
Company Ltd did accept some evidence of an oral agreement between the
parties relevant to the easement. The High Court was concerned that this
4 Weir, above n 2, at 183.
5 (2007) 233 CLR 528; 239 ALR 75; [2007] HCA 45; BC200708402 at [17].
6 Ibid, at [25]; Harris v Flower (1904) 74 LJ Ch 127; White v Chandler [2001] NZLR 28;
Peacock v Custins [2002] 1 WLR 1815; Note the criticisms of Harris v Flower view in
L Griggs, ‘To and From? But Not Across: the High Court ? Easements, Torrens and
Doctrinal purity’ (2008) 15 APLJ 260.
7 (2007) 233 CLR 528; 239 ALR 75; [2007] HCA 45; BC200708402 at [35]–[37].
8 Ibid.
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evidence was not being used as merely an aid in construing the easement, but
dealt with more fundamental issues. The High Court then stated:
37. These concern the operation of the Torrens system of title by registration, with
the maintenance of a publicly accessible register containing the terms of the dealings
with land under that system. To put the matter shortly, rules of evidence assisting the
construction of contracts inter partes, of the nature explained by authorities such as
Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW, did not apply to the
construction of the easement.
38. Recent decisions, including Halloran v Minister Administering National Parks
and Wildlife Act 1974 [26],Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say Dee Pty Ltd [27], and
Black v Garnock [28], have stressed the importance in litigation respecting title to
land under the Torrens system of the principle of indefeasibility expounded in
particular by this court in Breskvar v Wall[29].
39. The importance this has for the construction of the terms in which easements are
granted has been remarked by Gillard J in Riley v Penttila [30] and by Everett J in
Pearce v City of Hobart [31]. The statement by McHugh J in Gallagher v Rainbow
[32], that:
‘[t]he principles of construction that have been adopted in respect of the grant of
an easement at common law . . . are equally applicable to the grant of an easement
in respect of land under the Torrens system’, is too widely expressed. The third party
who inspects the Register cannot be expected, consistently with the scheme of the
Torrens system, to look further for extrinsic material which might establish facts or
circumstances existing at the time of the creation of the registered dealing and
placing the third party (or any court later seized of a dispute) in the situation of the
grantee.’ [33]
40. It is true that in Overland v Lenehan [34] Griffith CJ admitted extrinsic evidence
to show a misdescription of the boundaries of the land comprised in a certificate of
title. This is a matter now dealt with in the RP Act by the provisions in Pt 15
(ss 136–138) for the cancellation and correction of instruments. Subsequently, in
Powell v Langdon [35] Roper J accepted as applicable to the construction of a
particular grant of a right of way (apparently over land under the RPAct) a statement
by Sir George Jessel MR in Cannon v Villars [36]. This was that the content of the
bare grant of a right of way per se was to be ascertained by looking to the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument, including the nature of
the surface over which the grant applied. 9
These paragraphs require the construction of an easement registered under
the Torrens system using extrinsic evidence, to consider carefully the impact
this application may have on principles of indefeasibility. The statement in
para [37] that the Codelfa case principles should not apply in this situation is
significant.10 In the Codelfa case the High Court confirmed that in the context
of a contractual provision, ‘evidence of surrounding circumstances is
admissible to assist in the interpretation of the contract if the language is
ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning. But it is not admissible
to contradict the language of the contract when it has a plain meaning’.11 The
High Court in Westfield confirmed a narrow view of what extrinsic evidence
9 Ibid, at [37]–[40] (citations omitted).
10 Ibid, at [37].
11 [1981–1982] 149 CLR 337 at 352 per Mason J.
168 (2012) 21 Australian Property Law Journal
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is admissible in relation to registered easements set out in paragraphs
[37]-[40] above,12 when it later states: ‘It may be accepted, in the absence of
contrary argument, that evidence is admissible to make sense of that which the
Register identifies by the terms or expressions found therein. An example
would be the surveying terms and abbreviations which appear on the plan
found in this case on the DP.’13
In addition there was the suggestion at para [40] that this conservative
approach does not necessarily apply to bare easements, above which are
easements that, most likely by error, do not contain covenants.
The subsequent cases that have sought to apply Westfield have clearly
struggled to decipher the implications of the Westfield decision, resulting in
many different approaches and views about what the High Court actually
meant to state in regard to the construction of easements. The 2009 article
concluded with a discussion of four categories of evidence that may or may
not be applicable in construing registered easements in the light of the
Westfield decision:
(i) The express terms of the registered easement. This is clearly the
primary tool for construction of an easement accepted in Westfield.
This is part of the ratio decidendi of the case. After 5 years there is
nothing in any subsequent cases that have indicated any concerns
about this self-evident principle.
(ii) Extrinsic evidence about what the parties contemplated should be
applied to assist in the interpretation of the easement. This is clearly
repudiated in Westfield and is part of the ratio decidendi of the case.
Subsequent Australian cases have generally applied this view and it
has been a significant feature of subsequent cases.14
One notable NZ Court of Appeal decision in Big River Paradise Ltd v
Congreve15 has raised some significant issues in regard to the principles set
out in Westfield. That case involved the interpretation of a restrictive covenant
and it was urged upon the court that based upon the Westfield case extrinsic
evidence about the circumstances that pertained at the date of the creation of
a restrictive covenant should not be applied in interpreting this document
which was notified on the register. The court noted that the High Court in
Westfield ‘concluded that evidence as to the intentions and expectations of the
parties, at the time, was inadmissible as to construction but was rather more
equivocal as to the materiality of objective factors’16 such as the nature of the
surface of the land over which the easement was established.
The Court of Appeal suggested it is open to question if this principle should
be applied in New Zealand, and noted that authority in New Zealand favoured
interpreting an easement by applying principles relevant to contracts. The
Court of Appeal noted that Westfield ‘would sit rather oddly’ with s 317 of the
12 (2007) 233 CLR 528; 239 ALR 75; [2007] HCA 45; BC200708402 at [37]–[40].
13 Ibid, at [44].
14 Neighbourhood Association DP No 285220 v Moffat (unreported, NSW SC, White J,
30 January 2008) (Neighbourhood); Currumbin Investments Pty Ltd v Body Corporate
Mitchell Park Parkwood CTS [2012] QCA 9; BC201200376.
15 (2008) 6 NZ ConvC 194,610; [2008] 2 NZLR 402; [2008] NZCA 78 at [22]. An appeal to
the NZ SC was dismissed SC 21/2008 [2008] 2 NZLR 589; [2008] NZSC 51.
16 SC 21/2008 [2008] NZSC 51 at [18].
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Property Law Act 2007 (NZ) which allows a court to consider modifying an
easement where there was a change of use or a change of character of the
neighbourhood and any other circumstance the court considers relevant.17 The
Court of Appeal noted, ‘if it is legitimate to consider the circumstances at the
time of the creation of an easement or covenant when deciding whether to
modify or extinguish it, then it might be thought legitimate to consider the
same circumstances when engaged in an interpretation exercise’.18 Provisions
that are similar to s 317 of the Property Law Act (NZ) apply in most
jurisdictions in Australia.19 It should be noted that the High Court
acknowledged in Westfield that subsequent changes in circumstances could
provide the basis for an application for a modification or extinguishment of an
easement under s 89 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW).20 This would
suggest that in the circumstances considered by the High Court, their views
did not deny the application of the modification or extinguishment provisions.
The Court of Appeal also asked:
What if the easement was construed between the original parties to the easement or
restrictive covenant? If not, when should the narrow approach be applied — when
one party sells or both? What if the subsequent parties are well aware of the relevant
extrinsic evidence such as where the relevant use was continuing when the
subsequent party became affected by the easement or restrictive covenant.21
Based upon the application of the in personam exception, which
acknowledges the enforceability of contracts or equitable interests even in the
face of a registered interest in land,22 it would not appear to impact upon the
integrity of the register to allow extrinsic evidence of what was in the mind of
the parties to an easement, in relation to issues within the knowledge of both
parties especially if they were the original parties to an easement. The courts
have consistently held that the Torrens title legislation does not destroy the
ability to enforce contracts and equitable obligations entered into by the
registered owner.23 The enforcement of this exception to indefeasibility relies
upon the establishment of a binding contract24 or a trust or fiduciary
relationship between the registered owner and a third party.25 What was
overlooked by the Court of Appeal was that the High Court in Westfield
acknowledged that the conduct of the immediate parties to a dispute may
provide the basis of a personal equity.26 The High Court presumably
concluded a personal equity did not arise on the facts before it.
A scenario which could raise this issue would be a sale of land after the land
has been subdivided into two lots, with one lot now without a road frontage
17 Ibid, at [21].
18 Ibid.
19 See Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 181; Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 89.
20 [2007] 233 CLR 528; 239 ALR 75; [2007] HCA 45; BC200708402 at [43].
21 Ibid, at [22].
22 In Queensland based upon the express provisions of Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 185(1)(a)
and in other states based upon case law.
23 C MacDonald et al, Real Property Law in Queensland, 3rd ed, Thomson Reuters, 2010,
p 332; In Queensland this exception is expressly stated in the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld)
s 185(1)(a).
24 Valbirn v Powprop Pty Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 295.
25 Bahr v Nicholay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604; 78 ALR 1; 62 ALJR 268; BC8802595.
26 [2007] 233 CLR 528; 239 ALR 75; [2007] HCA 45; BC200708402 at [43].
170 (2012) 21 Australian Property Law Journal
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requiring an access easement. The landowners may enter into an easement and
the dominant tenement owner might, prior to the execution of the easement,
raise the need for access from the easement to a neighbouring property to
allow a pool to be installed on that property. The parties may enter into an
agreement that this will be allowed as a condition of the easement being
signed, though this condition is not reflected in the easement document.
Twelve months later, the dominant tenement owner seeks to use the easement
for the purpose of accessing the neighbouring property for the installation of
the pool. The principles from the Westfield case may allow the enforcement of
that arrangement against the registered interest based upon the in personam
exception.
(iii) Extrinsic evidence about the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the instrument and the nature of the surface over which
the easement is granted is admissible for bare easements. This aspect
of the type of evidence it seems has not been subsequently applied in
this manner. Subsequent cases that have involved a consideration of
bare easements are suggestive of not accepting that an exception
applies in the case of bare easements as was argued in the 2009
article, but these comments by the High Court have been used to
justify consideration of the nature of the surface over which the
easement is granted.27
One of the features of the Westfield case was the arguable differentiation
made in relation to bare easements, which are easements that are created, but
do not contain substantial covenants. It seems it is not an entirely unusual
occurrence.28 In Sertari Pty Ltd v Nirimba Developments Pty Ltd the NSW
Court of Appeal when consideringWestfield, referred to the words used by the
High Court at the end of para [40] to justify a conclusion that evidence of the
physical characteristics of the dominant and servient tenement are relevant to
an interpretation of an easement, but without reference to other extrinsic
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument.29 In this way the
NSW Court of Appeal in Sertari did not consider para [40] related only to the
circumstance of a bare easement but was applicable in a broader sense to
standard easements. The Court of Appeal did not consider the reference in
para [40] to ‘circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument
including the nature of the surface over which the grant applied’ should only
be applied in regard to bare easements. Subsequently in Neighbourhood
Association DP No 285220 v Moffat,30 which did involve a bare easement,
Justice White considered himself bound by the Court of Appeal decision in
Sertari. The Sertari decision did not deal with a bare easement and did not
refer to the considerations in para [40] in relation to bare easements but
applied a narrow interpretation of Westfield and accordingly excluded any
reference to the extrinsic circumstances to assist in the interpretation of what
was intended in relation to the easement other than the physical characteristics
27 Ibid, at [40].
28 Neighbourhood (unreported, NSW SC, White J, 30 January 2008); Currumbin Investments
Pty Ltd v Body Corporate Mitchell Park Parkwood CTS [2012] QCA 9; BC201200376.
29 Sertari Pty Ltd v Nirimba Developments Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 324 at [15].
30 Neighbourhood (unreported, NSW SC, White J, 30 January 2008).
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of the dominant and servient tenement.
Justice White was clearly of a mind to refer to the extrinsic evidence to
interpret the easement broadly based upon the expectations and intentions of
the parties to the easement. He referred to the last sentence of para [40] from
the Westfield case discussed above, and noted the High Court did not
disapprove of the approach taken in Powell v Langdon which involved a bare
grant of an easement. Justice White commented that: ‘I would not myself have
regarded the High Court’s decision as precluding recourse to all of the
objective matrix of facts bearing on the construction of the instrument.’31 In
the 2009 article it was suggested that this was a missed opportunity to take a
broader view of the Westfield principles in the context of bare easements.
This issue once again arose in the recent Queensland Court of Appeal case
of Currumbin Investments Pty Ltd v Body Corporate Mitchell Park Parkwood
CTS32 which involved the construction of a bare easement. It was argued in
this case that as the easement was a bare easement, it was legitimate to refer
to extrinsic evidence, being the files of town planners who acted for the
developer at the time of the creation of the easement, to establish the intention
of the grantor and grantee. Reference in this case was made to the
Neighbourhood case which had raised the possibility of extrinsic evidence
being applicable in the case of bare easements. The Court of Appeal in
Currumbin Investments however, rejected any liberal interpretation of the
Westfield doctrine on the basis of the High Court’s discussion in para [40] of
the judgement, and applied the view of the NSW Court of Appeal in Sertari.
Accordingly, it would seem that based upon the views of two senior courts, it
is not correct to interpret bare easements using extrinsic evidence as was
arguably raised in the Westfield case, other than in referring to the physical
characteristics of the dominant and servient tenement. It would seem that the
reference to this issue in para [40] should not be interpreted as providing an
exception to the general principles in the case.
If one reads para [40] carefully as the High Court refers to the relevance of
extrinsic evidence in relation to the special circumstance of a bare easement
where covenants have been omitted (which would be contrary to the thrust of
the rest of the judgement), it is arguable that the High Court was indeed
suggesting an exception did apply in relation to bare easements. The contrary
argument is that the reliance upon the statements in Cannon v Villars
discussed in para [40], which suggests an ability to consider the circumstances
surrounding the execution of an instrument was unsafe as that English case
involved a vague agreement providing access to a leasehold property and
related to non Torrens title land.
(iv) Evidence about the physical make-up of the dominant and servient
tenement at the time of the creation of the easement and the
dimensions of the easement area. On one view of Westfield this is
only relevant in the case of bare easements though this was not a
view preferred in Sertari and Currumbin Investments. On the basis of
these two cases this is probably admissible evidence though it is
31 Ibid, at [35].
32 Currumbin Investments Pty Ltd v Body Corporate Mitchell Park Parkwood CTS [2012]
QCA 9; BC201200376.
172 (2012) 21 Australian Property Law Journal
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 103 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Wed Dec 5 11:26:14 2012
/journals/journal/aplj/vol21pt2/part_2
suggested this is not particularly clear from Westfield based upon
para [40]. As it was not necessary to the decision in Westfield this
must be considered to be persuasive obiter. It would seem that the
Sertari and Currumbin Investments cases preferred to reject the
existence of a bare easement exception to allow the application of
evidence of the physical make-up of the dominant and servient
tenement in interpreting easements which were not bare easements.
Without that approach the Westfield case may have been viewed as
unduly restrictive in its application as the physical make-up of the
dominant and servient tenement is normally something that any
person could inspect.
Uncertainties created by Westfield?
One of the features of decisions that have discussed Westfield is that there is
a perceived uncertainty about what it is the High Court was attempting to state
in its decision. The quotes above in paras [37]–[40] did not seemingly deny
access to extrinsic evidence in all cases, and did not reject entirely Justice
McHugh’s statement in Gallagher v Rainbow; rather indicating it was too
broad. A significant recent decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in the
Currumbin Investments case sought to provide some clarity to its
interpretation. After rejecting the submission that the principles are different in
regard to bare easements, Justice Fryberg considered the meaning of what the
High Court stated in Westfield. In particular Justice Fryberg referred to the
High Court’s statement:
The third party who inspects the Register cannot be expected, consistently with the
scheme of the Torrens system, to look further for extrinsic material which might
establish facts or circumstances existing at the time of the creation of the registered
dealing and placing the third party (or any court later seized of a dispute) in the
situation of the grantee.33
Justice Fryberg considered this quote:
The words emphasised are important. The High Court was not saying that a third
party who inspects the register never needs to look further. It was not saying that
extrinsic evidence of facts and circumstances existing at the time of the creation of
the easement must always be disregarded. On the contrary, it referred to situations
where extrinsic evidence might be taken into account. What the court held was to be
disregarded was evidence which not only established facts and circumstances at the
time of the creation of the registered dealing but which also placed the third party
in the situation of the grantee (or for that matter, the grantor — the reasoning would
be the same). That was the reason for the court’s emphasis on disregarding ‘evidence
to establish the intention or contemplation of the parties to the grant of the
Easement’.
That is consistent with the High Court’s approval of the closing remarks in the
judgment of Hodgson JA in the Court of Appeal to which reference has already been
33 Ibid, at [39].
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made. His Honour referred to ‘the error resulting from a preparedness to look for the
intention or contemplation of the parties outside what was manifested by the grant
itself, construed in the circumstances’.34
In this way, Justice Fryberg was applying what is a fairly liberal
interpretation of the Westfield principles, but with an emphasis on limiting the
extrinsic evidence to where it required a third party or court to place
themselves in the position of the grantee or grantor. Justice Fryberg confirmed
the Sertari view that the physical characteristics of an easement may be
admissible as this may be freely observed by any third party interested in
them, but he noted that the possibility of change in those characteristics over
time may mean it is not appropriate to apply that evidence, and in this issue
the time that has elapsed since the creation of the easement is relevant. If an
easement has been recently created it may not offend Torrens principles to
admit that evidence but it may be a concern if this process is completed years
after the creation of the easement. He states: ‘it may be that the scope for
consideration of extrinsic evidence is reduced over time’.35 This approach
does echo the issue raised in the Court of Appeal in Big River Paradise Ltd
v Congreve where they questioned the application of the Westfield approach
when the original parties to the easement were still owners of the dominant
and servient tenement. In that case there is no third party who is placed in the
position of the grantee or grantor and the test applied by Justice Fryberg could
be satisfied. It also allows room for the application of the in personal
exception in some cases as discussed above.
The issue of how to interpret Westfield was also discussed in the judgement
of Slattery J in Brugge v Hare36 where the primary discussion focused on the
issue of the extent to which the physical characteristics of the tenements can
be taken into account when interpreting easements. Relying upon the view
taken in Sertari that extrinsic material apart from physical characteristics of
the tenements, is not relevant to the construction of instruments registered
under the Real Property Act, the court noted:
It is difficult to give content to the rights under an easement unless some account is
taken of the physical characteristics of the tenements. Otherwise the parties are
engaged in an empty debate about the meaning of words in an instrument without
reference to what is happening on the ground. The limitations of such a narrow view
was emphasised by Campbell JA in Phoenix Commercial Enterprises Pty Ltd v City
of Canada Bay Council [2010] NSWCA 64; BC201001880 at [158].
Thus, the approach taken in these reasons is to take into account information
appearing in the Register and the physical characteristics of the tenements in order
to determine the nature of the rights conferred under Easement B.37
The application of the Westfield case was also considered in Phoenix
Commercial Enterprises Pty Ltd v City of Canada Bay Council38 which
involved the interpretation of a registered lease. In interpreting the principles
that emerged from Westfield, the court noted:
34 Ibid, at [46]–[47].
35 Ibid, at [49].
36 (2011) 16 BPR 30,217; [2011] NSWSC 1364; BC201110153.
37 Ibid, at [36]–[37].
38 [2010] NSWCA 64; BC201001880 (1 April 2010).
174 (2012) 21 Australian Property Law Journal
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They do not deny the applicability of the principle whereby a document will be
construed as having the meaning that a reasonable reader, with such knowledge of
the surrounding circumstances as is available to him or her, would attribute to it. If
surrounding circumstances cannot be established by evidence to construe an
easement, that does not mean that one is thrown back onto the discredited exercise
of seeking to construe a document simply by reference to a supposed ‘natural and
ordinary meaning’ of the words. Rather, it means that the sort of surrounding
circumstances to which one can look are limited to those that one can know without
evidence from outside the terms of the document itself.39
This view fits quite neatly with the principle discussed by Justice Fryberg
in the Currumbin Investments case, with the focus being upon the extent to
which the reference to extrinsic evidence might be applied inappropriately, in
regard to a registered interest where a third party does not nor cannot know
factors at play in the creation of that registered interest.
There have been other cases where the basis for the Westfield decision has
been suggestive of the need to apply a narrow interpretation on what the High
Court said in Westfield. In Fermora Pty Ltd v Kelvedon Pty Ltd40 in regard to
the interpretation of an easement and the status of an associated unregistered
deed, Justice Edelman in interpreting this easement considered the decision in
Westfield and noted the basis of the decision was the need to protect the
integrity of the register and the concept of indefeasibility. Justice Edelman
then states that:
Viewed in light of this rationale, the exception which the High Court tentatively
applied inWestfield, without the benefit of argument on the point, must be of narrow
compass. The broader the exception, the greater the difficulty for third parties
inspecting the register to determine the nature of the rights and liberties to which
they are subject.41
Some cases have also taken a very narrow view of the ability of the capacity
to use extrinsic evidence in regard to interpreting easements. In Chick v
Dockray,42 the Full Court of the Tasmanian Supreme Court held that in
interpreting an easement, ‘the only extrinsic evidence that may be used is that
necessary to make sense of terms or expressions identified in the property
register, such as surveying terms, or abbreviations, which appear on a plan’.43
The general impression of the decisions since the Westfield case has
confirmed that in regard to bare easements, this should not be seen as a
separate category which is suggestive of a broader application of extrinsic
circumstances. Although to the writer this was a defendable interpretation of
the decision, subsequent case law led by the decision in Sertari has led other
courts to deny any special category of case for bare easements. In regard to the
relevance of the physical characteristics of the dominant and servient
tenements, Sertari suggested this was permissible based on Westfield, though
this was derived from the discussion of bare grants by the High Court in
39 Ibid, at [158].
40 [2011] WASC 281; BC201107897.
41 Ibid, at [39].
42 [2011] TASFC 1; BC201101768; refer also to a similarly narrow approach in Davidson v
Elkington [2011] WASC 29; BC201100406 (11 February 2011) at [29]; Staley v Pivot Group
Pty Ltd (No 6) [2010] WASC 228; BC201006248 (30 August 2010) at [93].
43 [2011] TASFC 1; BC201101768 at [20].
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Westfield. Subsequent cases have supported this view, though Currumbin
Investments has placed a gloss on this view by requiring caution in the use of
even this information, if there is length of time since the creation of the
easement.44
Are the principles of the Westfield case applicable to
interests other than easements?
One issue which was speculated about in the 2009 article was whether
Westfield could be applicable to other registered interests. As the High Court’s
views had as their bedrock the need to respect the integrity of the register, it
was arguable that this principle could be applied more broadly than just
easements. It seems, based upon subsequent case law, that this speculation has
proven to be correct, and it would seem the principles expressed in Westfield
may apply to the covenants of any registered instrument.
In Alliance Engineering Pty Ltd v Yarraburn Nominees Pty Ltd,45 one issue
in the case involved the lease of a hotel and whether the permitted use
provision for a ‘Hotel only’ allowed the operation of poker machines on the
premises. Submissions were made to the court that the construction of that
term had to have regard to the operation of the hotel at the time the lease
commenced, based upon the authority of Boreland v Docker.46 The judgement
of Justice Sackville stated:
Westfield involved the construction of a registered easement. The principle stated by
the High Court does not necessarily apply to all provisions in registered instruments
such as leases or mortgages. The reason is that ‘indefeasibility’ attaches only to those
covenants or provisions that are so intimately connected with the estate or interest
created by the registered instrument that they are to be regarded as part of that estate
or interest: Mercantile Credits Ltd v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (1976) 136 CLR 326
at 343; 9 ALR 39; 50 ALJR 487; BC7600036 per Gibbs J; Pt Ltd v Maradona Pty
Ltd (1992) 25 NSWLR 643 at 679; [1992] ANZ ConvR 513; (1992) NSW ConvR
55-620 per Giles J; Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v English (2010) 14 BPR 27,339;
[2010] NSWCA32; BC201001246 at [68], [92]–[98] per Sackville AJA (with whom
Allsop P and Campbell JA agreed). Extrinsic circumstances might therefore play a
part in the construction of provisions in a registered instrument that cannot be
regarded as part of the estate or interest in land created by the instrument.47
As the issue of whether Westfield applied to the construction of the
permitted use clause in this case was not argued before the court, it did not
reach a conclusion on the question of whether Westfield could apply to the
construction of a registered lease, but it was certainly suggested as a
possibility. The judge did suggest in this quote that the principles of Westfield
may not apply to those covenants that are not part of the estate or interest
created by the instrument. This has the potential if applied elsewhere to limit
the application of theWestfield doctrine by not impacting on covenants that do
not have the protection of indefeasibility. The clause considered in the
44 Dillon v Gosford City Council [2008] NSWLEC 186; BC200804226 (6 June 2008)
at [23]–[29].
45 [2011] NSWCA 301; BC201107311 (21 September 2011).
46 (2007) NSWCA 94.
47 Ibid, at [53].
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Westfield case, in relation to the nature of the rights over the servient tenement
and beyond, would deal with a matter about which indefeasibility would
attach as it would be considered as part of the registered easement estate.
There is considerable jurisprudence that indefeasibility does not apply to all
covenants in registered interests but only those that can be regarded as part of
the estate or interest in land created by the instrument in the case law specified
above in the quote from Justice Sackville’s judgment. This area of law, in
recent years, has drawn greater focus in relation to the issues surrounding the
enforcement of personal covenants against mortgagors in the case of
fraudulent but ultimately indefeasible registered mortgages where the
mortgagor has had a mortgage registered against their property through the
actions of a fraudulent third person by a bona fide mortgagee.48 There are two
differing points on that issue but it is suggested the better view is that a bona
fide mortgagor is not liable under the personal covenant to pay.49
Westfield was also mentioned as part of the views of the NSW Court of
Appeal in Phoenix Commercial Enterprises Pty Ltd v City of Canada Bay
Council,50 where Campbell JA noted that because some covenants in leases do
not ‘touch and concern’ the land they are not impacted by the concerns about
indefeasibility applied by the High Court in Westfield. Campbell JA
nevertheless noted the final sentence in para [39] ofWestfield is not dependent
upon any considerations of the extent of indefeasibility, but rather on the
inherent probabilities concerning the inquiries that a purchaser of Torrens title
land will make. This view resulted in the court not applying extrinsic evidence
beyond the terms of the lease document. The view of the Court of Appeal in
this case appears to differ from Alliance Engineering, in regard to the limit on
Westfield in relation to covenants that are not within the indefeasibility
concept but nevertheless Westfield was influential in supporting a narrow use
of extrinsic evidence to interpret a lease document.
In this decision it was acknowledged that different considerations may
apply in regard to this issue as between a lease and an easement.51 Although
an easement is the creation of a legal property right when created by
registration of a section 88B instrument, it can be a unilateral act by the
grantor, rather than a consensual one (indeed, frequently the creation of an
easement is a unilateral act, occurring when a subdivider of land registers a
plan of subdivision and an 88B instrument in anticipation of eventual sale of
lots in the subdivision). A lease, by contrast, is a consensual document, and
creates both contractual rights and property rights. Even recognising these
differences, the reasons provided by the High Court in Westfield were
48 S Grattan, ‘Recent Developments Regarding Forged Mortgages: The Interrelationship
Between Indefeasibility and the Personal Covenant to Pay’ (2009) 21(2) Bond LR 43;
MacDonald, above n 23, p 307.
49 Hilton v Gray (2008) ASC 155-094; (2008) Q ConvR 54-686; [2007] QSC 401;
BC200711894 (13 December 2007); Pt Ltd v Maradona Pty Ltd (1992) 25 NSWLR 643;
[1992] ANZ ConvR 513; (1992) NSW ConvR 55-620; Duncan v McDonald (1997) 3 NZLR
669; Grgic v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1994) 33 NSWLR 202; [1994] ANZ ConvR 334;
(1994) NSW ConvR 55-699; BC9405152.
50 [2010] NSWCA 64; BC201001880 (1 April 2010).
51 Ibid, at [159].
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acknowledged as capable of applying to a registered lease.52 There are a
number of authorities which involved restrictive covenants where courts have
now applied Westfield to the interpretation of these interests. In Prowse v
Johnston53 it was necessary on an application for a declaration to determine
whether a restrictive covenant which burdened Torrens title land, which
limited the number of houses on a property, would prohibit a proposed
development. It was argued in this case that the interpretation of restrictive
covenants was the same as the interpretation of any contract which could
include consideration of the intention of the parties which was to provide a
high quality residential development when the restrictive covenant was first
created in 1912. Justice Cavanough noted that based upon Westfield, the
ability to apply standard contractual principles to the interpretation of
registered covenants may be more limited. Justice Cavanough noted that
Westfield related to an easement rather than a restrictive covenant; that the
High Court did not expressly refer to restrictive covenants; there are
considerable differences between the two; and that there are differences
between the relevant Torrens system provisions of New South Wales and of
Victoria.54
Justice Cavanough noted the High Court’s reasoning was not expressly
confined to the case of easements under the Torrens legislation of New South
Wales and referred to ‘fundamental considerations’ concerning the operation
of the Torrens system of title by registration, being considerations which
involved ‘the maintenance of a publicly accessible register containing the
terms of the dealings with land under that system’.55 The court also referred
with apparent approval to the Victorian case of Riley v Pentilla, as being a case
in which the importance of the principle of indefeasibility for the construction
of easements was duly recognised. Justice Cavanough noted the full
implications of Westfield are still being worked out and in Ryan v Sutherland,
Black J of the NSW Supreme Court treated it as applicable to restrictive
covenants. In this case the court made reference to the registered plan of
subdivision and other corresponding covenants in the development which
could be searched to assist in the construction of the restrictive covenant.56 In
this way the Westfield principles were applied in this case.
Conclusion
The case law since Westfield has confirmed that there are somewhat differing
views about how the principles in this case are to be appropriately applied.
This has resulted from the somewhat delphic manner of expression by the
High Court in the Westfield case. In addition it is difficult to apply the
principles in this case with the varied circumstances that arise in relation to
registered easements and other registered interests, bearing in mind that the
task of construing these documents may either occur shortly after their
52 Refer also to Boss v Hamilton Island Enterprises Ltd [2010] 2 Qd R 115; [2009] QCA 229;
BC200907223 (11 August 2010) at [67]–[70].
53 [2012] VSC 4; BC201200050 (11 January 2012).
54 Ibid, at [57].
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid, at [58].
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creation or many years later. It seems that based upon the views of a number
of decisions that Westfield has been interpreted to allow evidence about the
physical make-up of the dominant and servient tenement at the time of the
creation of the easement and the dimensions of the easement area to be used
in construing easements. The issues raised in the NZ case Big River Paradise
Ltd v Congreve do raise some significant questions about the boundaries of the
principles of the Westfield case. The observance of the need for protection of
the integrity of the register is well-founded. It is suggested that the principles
discussed by Justice Fryberg in the Currumbin Investments case provides the
most perceptive method to apply Westfield, his judgment acknowledges the
need to respect the integrity of the register, while respecting the fact that
where the use of extrinsic evidence requires a third party to be aware of
information outside of the terms of an easement, and which is not readily
available to that person, then that extrinsic evidence should not be applied to
the interpretation of the easement. This does provide some room to refer to
extrinsic evidence known to the parties to the easement, if the original parties
are still owners of the dominant and servient tenement, drawing upon the
principles at the basis of the in personam exception. It is clear that the
principles in Westfield can be applied to other registered interests, such as
leases. Despite the indications by the High Court provided in para [40], there
is from the perspective of a number of decisions no exception for bare
easements that allows a broadening of the reference to extrinsic
circumstances.
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